CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

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MEMORANDUM (O/NE Distribution Only)

SUBJECT: Political Violence in Latin America

NOTE

This memorandum, which emphasizes the international implications of Latin America's endemic political violence, may be of interest to members of the Board. It is based on the papers I prepared earlier in the year for the seminars on political violence of the Institute for Strategic Study. The last Chapter is a summary of my views on the subject, filtered by the distance and innocence of current materials [redacted] STAT
STAT [redacted] I would plan a meeting on the paper of interested Board and Staff members for purposes of discussion only.

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INTRODUCTION

1. During the decade of the 1960s the previously insignificant Island of Cuba exercised a remarkable impact on the course of developments not only in the rest of Latin America but in the rest of the world as well. Fidel Castro had appeared to topple the entrenched dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista in relatively short order through a campaign of guerrilla warfare: Castro had opened his insurgency with a small band of men in a remote mountainous region in December 1956; his "army" had marched into Havana unopposed in January 1959. Then over the next few years the Castro regime proceeded to destroy Cuba's old political and social order and to substitute a revolutionary new one. Over the same period Castro proceeded to destroy as well his country's old ties to the United States, which had exercised hegemonic powers over Cuba for sixty years -- and to substitute intimate political, economic, and military connections with the Soviet Union, which at the start of 1959 had not enjoyed as much as diplomatic relations with the Island Republic. And during these years Castro and his colleague Ernesto (Che) Guevara became tireless advocates of revolutionary political violence on the part of radical groups in all other countries who sought to duplicate Cuba's feat of destroying the established order at home while defying the interests of the United States and other foreign adversaries.

2. The most dramatic consequence of this process of political violence and revolutionary change erupted from the establishment in Cuba, literally on the Caribbean doorstep of the United States, of a formidable Soviet military presence. In capitals throughout the world, but especially in Washington and Moscow, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 evoked more intense fears of a possible nuclear holocaust than any other event before or since.

3. Even before the missile crisis, events in Cuba had contributed to a growing sense of urgency among political and military leaders in Washington regarding the need for a strategy to protect the world position of the United States from the dangers implicit in campaigns of political violence in "developing" countries, and the need for tactics to counter the supposed special potency of insurgencies and other forms of "irregular warfare." Thus the Cuban phenomenon was a mainspring behind the priority assigned under the Alliance for Progress to the promotion of peaceful reform and development in Latin America, as well as to the dispatch of military and police advisors and equipment to those governments facing a threat from Castro-style insurgents. Along these lines, the Cuban phenomenon probably was also one of the many factors responsible for locking the United States into its prolonged and costly military engagement against Communist insurgency in South Vietnam.

4. Once again closer to home, the Cuban example of revolutionary change through political violence, the Castro regime's optimistic propaganda in favor of revolutionary violence, and its willingness to provide material as well as moral assistance to various receptive groups helped provoke campaigns of guerrilla warfare and urban terrorism throughout Latin America. And even as nearly all these campaigns failed or foundered, and Guevara met his death while directing a particularly ill-fated one in Bolivia (1967), the Cuban phenomenon and mystique appeared to strengthen the attraction of would-be revolutionaries in the United States and Western Europe towards the use of political violence.

5. But why was there not to be a "Second Cuba" in Latin America during the 1960s as Castro had hoped (that is, another case in which a relatively small group of revolutionaries overthrow the established order through a campaign of political violence)? And why was there not a "Second Vietnam", to bleed the strength of the United States in the heartland of South America, as Guevara had dreamed? For one thing, Castro's dramatic success affected the attitudes and behavior not only of would-be imitators and of concerned foreign powers, but also of those groups within Latin America which had to confront the consequences of revolutionary political violence -- particularly the military establishments. The most "successful" form of political violence during the 1960s, just as

during past decades, was the military *coup d'etat*. The Latin American military were able to do precisely what proved to be beyond the grasp of the guerrillas and terrorists: short-circuit formal constitutional procedures by using force to obtain their political objectives. Most of the 17 successful military coups during the sixties (affecting ten countries) were at least in part a reaction to the threat, immediate or imagined, of revolutionary violence. And at least one of the coups, that in Peru in 1968, appeared to steal the revolutionaries' thunder and in itself force profound and far-reaching changes on the direction of domestic and foreign policy.

6. The main purpose of this memorandum is to examine the record of political violence in Latin America, particularly during the 1960s, in search of patterns which may contribute to an understanding of the implications of insurgencies and military coups, both for the countries of the region and for the world powers as well. In other words, under what circumstances would Latin America's seemingly endemic political violence be most likely to exercise a profound impact on the countries directly involved, and under what circumstances would the security interests of outside powers, most notably the United States, become dramatically engaged? What are the prospects during the 1970s for a "Second Cuba", or a "Second Vietnam", or for that matter for World War III somehow to break out in Latin America?

7. Section I of this Paper will attempt to address the issue of political violence in general terms, in order to place the events in Latin America into a wider perspective. Section II will present an analysis of the particular role of violence in Latin American politics. Section III will assess the key events of the 1960s within Latin America, while Section IV will examine the role played by foreign powers, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union. Finally, Section V will present some conclusions and a brief look forward into the already turbulent seventies.

I. POLITICAL VIOLENCE

8. The countries of Latin America did not "invent" political violence, nor do they now hold any monopoly on the practice. Indeed there would appear to have been a resurgence in rebellions, insurrections and such the world over in recent decades, or at least in the attention such violence commands in the absence of conventional warfare between the major powers. During the past 25 years, thousands of cases of political violence have been recorded, affecting all but a handful of the 100 or so larger nations and colonies

of the world.[1/] The following examples of political violence, culled from the chronologies of Strategic Survey 1970,[2/] indicate the geographic range of countries affected in that one year (excluding Latin America): civil wars in Jordan and in Nigeria; military coups in Cambodia and in Syria; guerrilla insurgencies by blacks against Portuguese rule in Angola and Mozambique, by Moslems against Ethiopian rule in Eritrea, and by pro-Communist forces in West Bengal northern Burma, and East Malaysia; riots over "black power" in Bermuda and Trinidad, over economic policy in Poland, over election results in the Philippines, over the location of regional capitals in Italy, and over the presence of American troops in Turkey; acts of terrorism by separatists in Canada, Northern Ireland, and Northern Spain, and by various political extremists in France and the United States.

1/ See for example the data presented in Ted Robert Gurr's "A comparative Study of Civil Strife", Violence in America: Historical and comparative Perspectives, edited by Hugh Davis Graham and Gurr (New York: Bantam Books, 1969), pp. 572-631.

The case that there has in fact been an increase in the incidence of political violence, as distinct from an increase in attention to the phenomenon, is difficult to prove, especially when due consideration is given the lower level of attention paid before the Second World War to such matters as minor outbreaks of disorder in this or that British or French dependency.

2/ Institute for Strategic Studies (London), 1971, pp. 75-95.

9. What is the common denominator of these varied events? As used in this Paper, political violence refers to the use of force by organized domestic groups to achieve their political objectives. In the strictest sense it is *civil* violence in that the primary target is the civil or domestic political process. Large-scale combat and bloodshed are not essential characteristics, for at times the political objectives can be obtained merely by marshalling strength and threatening violence, as in the case of certain military coups. What is essential is the recourse to the actual or threatened use of violence to manipulate the political system through coercion, and thus sidestep the formal (and presumably peaceful) constitutional procedures. The goals of political violence can be to make a revolution, or to prevent one; to overthrow a tyranny, or to impose one; to gain control of the government, or relief from its sway. It can be directed towards a change in policy without changing the personnel or government, or conversely towards changing the hand at the helm (or the till) without much concern for the overall content of policy. In short, much of what is recorded as political history -- some of man's best moments and his worst -- seems to turn around instances of political violence. And the prophets and practitioners of such violence by definition should be considered neither the good nor the bad guys of history, but merely participants in the political

process who, for a broad range of reasons, place their trust in force and coercion rather than in debate and other peaceful procedures.*

10. Several authorities have defined political violence within nations to be analogous to Clausewitz' classical definition of wars between nations; i.e., political violence would be the continuation of domestic politics "by other means". In truth the boundary line between regular political activity and political violence, as herein defined, is often difficult to discern in fact or even to fix in theory. This is especially the case in societies where politics still are bitterly contentious over basic issues and the governments in power often are either the product of some recent act of political violence or depend heavily upon coercion to maintain their hold on office. In such societies there can be an implicit threat of potential violent action even in speeches delivered peacefully within the halls of the legislature or to crowds outside the presidential palace. Thus the spokesman may really be saying,

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* *The definition of political violence used in this Paper is similar to the one offered by Ted Robert Gurr in Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 3-4. "Political violence refers to all collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors -- including competing political groups as well as incumbents -- or its policies. The concept represents a set of events, a common property of which is the actual or threatened use of violence, but the explanation is not limited to that property. The concept subsumes revolution . . . It also includes guerrilla wars, coups d'etat, rebellions, and riots".*

"give us our fair share or we shall have to consider alternative means for protecting our interests". Be that as it may, I would suggest that the coercion implicit in political violence commences when life, property, or fundamental rights are endangered; not necessarily with the massing of a group, but with its first menacing move. On the part of governments, political coercion would begin when their actions go beyond the requirements for protecting normal political processes and become open efforts either to quash specific opposition groups or to take the offensive against the lives, rights, or property of broad groups among the citizenry.

11. The boundaries between political violence (or civil conflict) and international violence (or war) are similarly clouded. At least during recent decades, nearly all cases of political violence that were either relatively prolonged or profound in domestic consequences embraced some important international aspects. Yet I would consider the violence to be political whenever the practitioners possess credibility as a domestic political group and so long as their principal purpose is to affect the politics of the "host" country. Therefore I would not exclude cases merely because foreign assistance is received (such as Castro has given to guerrilla groups in Latin America and which he himself received from various countries during his campaign against Batista), or because international borders are repeatedly crossed to carry out the violence (e.g., the use

by Mozambique guerrillas of Tanzania as a staging ground and safe-haven) and foreign countries otherwise involved (the hijacking of aircraft, the kidnapping of diplomats).

12. This is not to deny the importance of foreign involvement: As is apparent, when domestic violence seems to serve or threaten the *national interest* of foreign countries they generally respond accordingly. Premier Castro sent Cubans and equipment to support the revolutionary insurgents in Venezuela; Presidents Kennedy and Johnson sent a larger number of military and police advisors and a greater volume of equipment to help combat them. And when a country becomes convinced that its *national security* is at stake in another country's political violence, it may step in directly; e.g., the US military occupation of the Dominican Republic in 1965. At a certain point, of course, intervention on a large scale by one or more foreign countries turns a case of political violence into international violence, whether or not formally called *war* by the participants. Vietnam would clearly be one such instance.

13. Once these definition are accepted it then becomes reasonable to conclude that political violence dates back to the birth of politics and has persisted ever since in nearly all relatively complex political communities. Few indeed are the societies invariably blessed with universal consensus on who should rule and how; where

every group is content to play the game of politics according to the formal rules, no matter how stacked these may be against their special interests; and where the government and the elites it represents always place their trust in due process when challenged by critics, popular and otherwise. What varies then -- over time and from community to community -- is not so much the presence or absence of political violence, but rather such issues as its frequency, intensity, style, objectives, and significance.

14. Some observers would perhaps point to traditional societies as ones, in theory, relatively free of political instability and violence. This may be true once the often bloody issues of the legitimacy of the ruler, the geographic range of his realm, and his relationship with his most powerful supporters are settled. After that, and until the destabilizing process of modernization commences, few subjects of the realm question the inevitability of the existing order of things, including the legitimacy of the political hierarchy. And fewer still see much profit in challenging the government per se, which holds a near-monopoly of what passes for sophisticated implements of force. The trouble is that few societies today stand at the point of stasis between the old and the new pressures for political violence; perhaps few ever did.

15. Again in theory, political violence is not generally a crucial problem in highly developed societies. This is partly because the modernized state also holds a near-monopoly on sophisticated implements of coercion. What is probably more important is the fact that such governments usually possess the capacity to deal with the most pressing needs and demands of the population -- to keep the system rolling more or less peacefully, as it were, by oiling the most important squeaking wheels. Political violence exists in these societies; it may even be endemic. It is just that the violence does not regularly threaten the government's hold on office, much less the survival of the general political system. In part, by calling attention to problems and quickening the pace of change, violence may serve stability over the long term, even if at high cost to short-term peace.

16. But the relationship between technological development and the problem of political violence is a complex one. What of the so-called postmodern state? On the one hand, the more technologically complex a society becomes, the more it lies hostage to the violent disruptions of small groups determined to use the technology against it (e.g., plastic bombs against government and commercial centers). On the other hand, the more advanced the technology, the better able the government should be to meet the demands of the great bulk of the populace, and to quash the remainder. Developments in

the United States in recent years indicate the difficulties a government can face in this equation. Perhaps the technology of effective and responsive government tends to lag behind that of war and violence. The physical size of the government and the demands of various political groups grow apace -- but not necessarily the solutions to domestic problems. The "impotence of power" then relates to the performance of governments at home as well as in foreign affairs.

17. In any case it is in the transitional societies -- those developing and modernizing -- that political violence is likely to be the most prevalent or at least the most profound in its local significance. These very processes tend to strip the reigning hierarchies of their cover of inevitability and reveal their impotency when it comes to coping with the tensions of change, the pressures of competing elite groups, and the demands for recognition on the part of the formerly quiescent masses. In truth, effective governments, whether skilled at solving problems or quashing opponents, do not often get overthrown even in the developing world. It may be equally true that the leaders of successful coups against woebegotten regimes do not always provide noticeably improved government. Yet neither the populace at large nor key elite groups are likely to consider the deposed crowd a great loss. When they do, coups frequently abort. In short, one key to political violence in

transitional societies is weak and ineffective governments and political institutions that can neither quash the violence nor harness its energy towards the amelioration of societal tensions.*

18. Many factors that are at least partly independent of the quality of government also influence the periodicity of political violence and its prospects for profound impact on the history of a developing society. Curves of economic prosperity and depression would be one such factor, and so would such psychological variations on that theme as popular expectations *re* living conditions, material and otherwise. Fluctuations in the views of key groups, especially the military and the intelligentsia, on their actual and proper role in society would be still another. Especially in colonial societies and those with restless and discontented ethnic minorities, a frustrated nationalism can be the key factor in chronic political instability and violence. But political exploitation of local feelings against foreign interests and influence can produce similar patterns in titularly independent countries with relatively homogeneous societies.

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* *This view is pressed at great length in Samuel P. Huntington's Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1968), especially Chapter 1.*

19. The very pace of modernization can also be an important factor, especially when it causes rapid increases in the number of groups that are politically aware and places a great rush of fresh demands against the government's relatively static financial and administrative ability to cope. One final noteworthy factor would be the influence of events and ideas from abroad which underscore the alternatives to the existing state of affairs. And these need not come only from countries that have successfully developed so to speak. As previously indicated, the example of Castro's success against Batista had a marked impact on the rash of revolutionary violence that broke out in Latin America during the 1960s -- much more so than did the ideology and clandestine operations emanating from the Soviet Union. Similarly, Castro's physical elimination of Batista's civilian and military supporters had much to do with the spate of military coups intended to counteract the aforementioned revolutionary rash -- probably more so than the anti-Communist rhetoric and the counterinsurgency assistance emanating from the United States.

20. Presumably, steady economic expansion, accompanied by a carefully-managed enlargement of popular participation in national politics and in modern society generally, and a low level of upsetting nationalistic issues and exogenous examples would encourage stability in a developing society. This course of events would

suppose a relatively effective government, respected if not also popular. In contrast, slow and uneven economic growth, together with rapid expansion of the demands placed against the government, as well as an abundance of disturbing nationalistic and external influences would stimulate instability and political violence. Here we might expect to find, generally speaking, beleaguered and ineffective government, neither popular nor particularly respected. Such a doleful description would fit a good number of the Latin American countries during the decade of the sixties.

II. SOME OBSERVATIONS ON POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICA

21. If one believed that political violence was by definition wrong and harmful, then contemporary Latin America would have a most unenviable record. Since 1930 the Twenty Spanish-, Portuguese-, and French-speaking independent countries of the New World have experienced more than 100 forceful overthrows of government, and many times that number of aborted and unsuccessful coups, insurrections, and insurgencies. The record for "irregular" governmental changes would probably have been considerably higher if various dictatorial regimes had not managed to hold on to office for extended periods through systematic applications of force and

coercion (e.g., Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, 1931-61; Francois Duvalier in Haiti, 1957-71; Fidel Castro in Cuba, 1959-).*

22. The purpose of this section is to set down a series of themes or observations to help explain this profusion of political violence and also the character it took, especially during the 1960s. While some attempt at heroic simplification is perhaps essential, it is also essential to acknowledge the imposing limitations to such generalizations. First of all, despite important similarities in history and culture, there is a remarkable diversity among the twenty countries of Latin America. The differences among them are fundamental and striking in such matters as area and climate, size and composition of population, mix and quality of natural resources, and stage of economic development, as well as in the relative sophistication of political and social institutions and the actual

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* *Political violence was probably at least as prevalent in earlier periods of Latin American history. We are obligated to a nameless (and presumably tired) historian for the following, reported in Atlantic Research Corporation, A Historical Survey of Patterns and Techniques of Insurgency Conflicts in Post-1900 Latin America, 1964:*

> *Historians have grown haggard in the task of counting up all the insurgencies and civil wars to which the "Age of Caudillos" gave rise. Venezuela, for example, had suffered 52 important revolts by 1912. Bolivia had more than 60 "revolutions" by 1898 and had assassinated six presidents. Colombia had experienced 27 civil wars, one of which claimed 80,000 and another 100,000 lives. These are among the more extreme examples but many of the other republics did not lag far behind.*

interrelationships among them. Not only are there profound contrasts between such relatively advanced states as Argentina, Chile, and Mexico on the one hand, and such less advanced societies as Bolivia, Guatemala, and Haiti on the other; but there are also outstanding differences between states in each of these categories -- e.g., the relative importance of elections and of military intervention in politics in neighboring Argentina and Chile. In short, the differences in national character and political culture at the extremes -- say between Haiti and Mexico, or Bolivia and Chile -- are at least as great as those that would impede generalizations on Europe meant to cover both Great Britain and Portugal, or even Albania.

23. Sound and lasting generalization is also made difficult by the fact that most countries in Latin America have been undergoing great pressures for change; in particular, the attitude towards the phenomenon of change is itself changing, both on the part of mass groups and key elites (e.g., elements within the military and the Roman Catholic Church). The balance of forces between these new pressures and the old ways both varies as between countries and shifts within the individual countries. Thus explanations for the sixties do not quite fit the 1950s, and may have still less relevance for the 1970s.

24. Then there is the question of approach to a complex, variegated and shifting reality which forces uneasy choices in emphasis. Some analysts and observers would prefer to place the heaviest stress on the heritage of history, especially the struggles for independence and the era of *caudillos*; some would stress psychological factors, particularly the unsheathed drive of Latin Americans to be *macho* or manly; some would stress international economic relations -- the instability perpetuated by neo-colonial dependence on terms of trade imposed by foreign powers. Alas, it is much like the proverbial peeling of an onion in search of an elusive core. I prefer to emphasize the operations of the political systems of the Latin American countries, although I recognize that other approaches which lead to different and at times conflicting generalizations also have claims to validity.*

25. The preceding section makes a point of weak governments and political institutions as a root cause of political violence

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* *I am indebted to several incisive studies for the honing of the approach of the following paragraphs. I list them with appreciation, though I recognize the authors may not appreciate the specific molds and mixes I devise: Charles W. Anderson, Politics and Economic Change in Latin America (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1967). R.R. Fagen and W.A. Cornelius, Jr., Political Power in Latin America: Seven Confrontations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970).*

in developing societies. But why, after more than a century of political independence, are these still relatively weak in most Latin American countries? In good measure the answer is that politically-significant groups prefer them to be weak; that is, they choose to maintain options and alternatives to strong and stable governments based on binding formal constitutions and laws and on effective supporting political institutions. Certainly, formal constitutional requirements (*re* elections and such) and regular quasi-constitutional procedures by which political parties and other institutions complement and implement the constitution are not given the same degree of exclusive legitimacy in most Latin American countries as is the case in the United States and Great Britain. Expressed as a reciprocal, violence and coercion in politics enjoy a much higher degree of acceptability and, in effect, legitimacy among key groups in Latin America than in countries where violence in politics (however prevalent) is not considered a proper means for effecting a change in the national government or its key policies. This then is the central point: Important groups in Latin American society with a major stake in its preservation conceive of political violence as a suitable alternative to formal constitutional procedures when deemed necessary to protect their interests, solve national problems, and exit from political impasses. Political violence, therefore, is not the exclusive province of would-be revolutionaries bent on destroying the system or of local groups acting out of either sudden anger or desperation.

26. One expression of the weakness of governments in most Latin American countries is the paucity of relatively principled, disciplined, and broadly-based political parties, which are capable of winning majority support throughout the nation in elections and then of running the government effectively once in office. Political parties tend instead to be personalistic, loosely-organized, and narrowly-based. As a result, governments tend to be dependent upon elaborate, diverse, and delicate coalitions of political parties and other politically-articulate groups merely to maintain office and certainly to govern with any authority. The president of the republic, in effect, requires the support of various political parties represented in the legislature and of sundry local political bosses, and also of key elements from the military, the social oligarchy, the business community, the professional classes, organized labor, and the bureaucracy -- all elite groups by contrast with the mass of peasants and unskilled, low-paid workers. The coalitions are intended to protect the interests of the multitude of elite groups they represent; consequently they tend to coalesce on basically pragmatic and cautious programs rather than on innovative ones. If one key element falls out of the coalition -- because it sees its interests jeopardized or slighted; or because its reach exceeds its grasp -- it will often take soundings for a possible *coup d'état* or consider some

other act of political coercion to protect its interests. Since many elements in the informal coalition are potential if not actual rivals to the faction titularly in control of the government, major political crises frequently lead to increased soundings for a coup rather than to a rallying behind the government to tide it through its constitutional term of office.

27. The leaders of such coalitions from time to time attempt to consolidate their personal power, either through building a broad popular base or a coercive dictatorship based on control (not merely the support) of the military and other official and unofficial security forces. Neither approach is a simple task, especially in the larger and more complex societies, precisely because the various elite groups will work (and fight) to maintain an independent influence on government affairs. Colonel Juan Perón, for example, came to power in Argentina (1945) with the support of many elite groups including most factions within the military. When he attempted to dominate politics through a mass party and when his populist policies tended to threaten the interests of various groups, his former

military colleagues, egged on by civilian elites, forced him out of office (1955).*

28. The breach of the formal constitution by a military coup is the most obvious form of political violence in Latin America. During an earlier era, most countries were subjected to periods of personal rule by a series of military *caudillos*, and most coups represented power grabs by competing ambitious generals or colonels. In some of the smaller and chronically unstable republics, where the military and most other institutions still tend to be more personalistic than professional, some coups continue to represent, to a considerable degree, a *push* for perquisites and power from within the military establishment. However, especially in the larger, relatively more developed and sophisticated countries, with correspondingly more sophisticated and professional military establishments, coups have come increasingly to represent not only

* *Perhaps the two most effective political systems in Latin America during the 1960s were in Cuba and Mexico. Castro was able, through force and popular appeal, to liquidate the influence not only of pro-Batista groups but also of competing anti-Batista groups, including some which had contributed to the dictator's downfall. In short, coalition politics were eliminated. In Mexico, in contrast, the multi-faceted coalition is institutionalized in a single political party. Its genius is an arrangement whereby the powerful presidency changes hands with each election, a contest which the "government party" always wins handsomely, but which nonetheless forces it to take careful soundings of the needs and interests of coalition members.*

the individual interests of key generals or the corporate interests of the officer corps as an elite but also the military's views of the national interest. The element of *push* is rarely totally absent, at least on the part of certain ambitious officers and factions; and the military, as do all other elites, tend to identify the national interest with their special interests. Nonetheless, a strong element of *pull* from the general society -- where problems are seen by the military to be mounting and civilian leadership is found wanting -- is increasingly present.*

29. At times these latter-day military coups have fostered important changes in society by reducing the exclusive hold on power of a narrow range of existing elites or even of a reigning military dictatorship. But by and large they have served as a check against abrupt shifts in political power and national character, whether represented by an organized political movement or by the disorders attendant upon the impending collapse of a government. Often the military or key factions within the institution exercise their political influence by means short of a coup, which nonetheless

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* *The concept of the military being motivated by factors of "push and pull" is presented, within a somewhat different context, by Martin C. Needler, Political Development in Latin America: Instability, Violence, and Evolutionary Change (New York: Random House, 1968), Chapter IV.*

serve to alter the personnel or policy direction of the ruling civilian government. The element of coercion is often present, for the alternative to the requested changes could be a military seizure of power.

30. Only rarely do the military stand and move alone in exercising such political interference, aligned as it were against a phalanx of all the other significant political forces -- the one for resort to force in politics, the other for sole reliance on parliamentary resolution of tensions and impasses. Usually, a military coup has the positive support of important civilian groups; at times the preponderant part of the politically-articulate population accepts the coming of a coup with a combination of enthusiasm, relief, and indifference. While some groups see their interests jeopardized, others see them enhanced by the coup and the prospects for a new coalition of influence. Indeed, as previously indicated, the civilian elements often take sounding among the military in search of a coup that could advance their interests. Again, political violence is seen by those satisfied with the overall political system as an acceptable alternative means for manipulating said

system. Elections are important in Latin America; it is just that they do not represent the only legitimate road to power.*

31. What about political violence on the part of small radical groups that seek to destroy rather than manipulate the existing political system? Of course, if they could win the support of the military, or even of an important faction or installation, they would consider a coup. Similarly, if they could bring the masses into the streets behind *their* cause, they would consider urban insurrections and general strikes. Only rarely have they had these options in any realistic sense; somewhat more frequently they have participated, as welcome-or-not junior partners, when more formidable political groups have led the way. As a rule the radicals when on their own are restricted to violent tactics which require neither a military nor a broad political base; e.g., terrorism or small

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* *Fagen and Cornelius, op. cit., p. 401, present the following observation on the military in politics (italics in the original):*

> *The military could not possibly figure so prominently in the governance of Latin America were they not so well integrated into the political process. By this we mean that, however much it might shock "democratic" sensibilities, the Latin American military participate in the political process with substantial civilian support, as members of coalitions, arbitrators of disputes, watchdogs of the rules of the game, an extremely powerful corporate interest group, and consumers of the national patrimony.*

violent demonstrations. In the past, this violence usually took place in the larger cities where the radicals resided as students or young professionals. Although semi-political outlaw bands operated in several countries during the 1940s and 1950s, Castro's campaign was perhaps the first example in some time of urban-based radicals undertaking guerrilla warfare in the countryside.

32. The operations of these radical groups in and of themselves can represent a potential threat to the government and to the collection of special interest groups it serves. The fear is usually present, moreover, that the radicals will somehow take dramatic advantage during a sudden crisis of the known grievances and suspected bitterness of such mass groups as the poor peasants and the urban slumdwellers. A more immediate danger exists of radical control of demonstrations by such better-organized groups as students and trade unionists. When tensions heat, therefore, no matter what the actual role and influence of the radicals, the response of many a government is to blame the "Communists" and other extremists for the troubles, and to come forcefully to the defense of the political system. With or without the urgings of the military and other concerned elites, states of seige are commonly declared and various coercive acts by the police and other security forces are employed (e.g., preventive arrests and even torture and officially-sponsored terrorism). The governments know

that loss of control of the streets to the protestants can mean loss of office to a military junta.

33. In general, then, political violence has its practitioners both within and without the centers of political power, and the former usually possess distinct advantages in both experience and political and military strength in any contest of "extra-constitutionalism" that serve to block the road to power via violence for the latter. As a consequence of this, a sudden profusion of political violence in Latin America has not generally meant that the political system in the affected country is facing imminent collapse. It has often been more symptomatic of the operation of the system according to one widely condoned alternative path to formal constitutionalism than of any surge of strength on the part of the enemies of the system or weakening of the hold on power of the entrenched elites. In fact, periodic outbreaks of political violence have been the basis for a kind of stability of the ruling political system (as distinct from the reigning government), protecting it from sudden radical changes.

34. Indeed, the prevalence of *political violence* in Latin America has not at all meant the prevalence of *revolution*, in the strict sense of the term -- that is, relatively abrupt, profound, and lasting changes, first in political power relationships, and then in social and economic institutions as well, by means of

which old elites are eliminated as well as new elites formed. Castro's changes in Cuba following the fall of Batista in 1959 would be one clear case of thoroughgoing revolution. In contrast, as previously underscored, most successful coups serve to redistribute power amongst existing elite groups, or perhaps to add some new groups to elite status. The losing groups are moved from the center of power and influence, but are not eliminated from the political scene. At times they retain not only a degree of influence on affairs but also a power to veto or apply the brakes to more drastic political and social changes.*

35. Given the general receptivity of most of the Latin American countries to violence as an alternative political procedure, under the unwritten constitution as it were, there still is a need for specific pressures and problems -- for indications that the politicians in office were failing to cope -- to help account for the spate of insurgencies and coups of the 1960s. The frame of reference by which the revolutionary insurgents on the one hand and

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* *Latin American authorities differ in their listings of examples of revolution in the twentieth century according to the strictness of their definition. In addition to Cuba, almost always included are Mexico (the elimination of the influence of foreign economic interests and their wealthy and conservative Mexican allies, starting in 1910) and Bolivia (the removal from power of the native tin barons, the landed oligarchy, and foreign economic interests, starting in 1952).*

the generally conservative military establishments on the other interpreted the requirements of the national interest and the dangers and inequities of the *status quo* may have differed considerably. Yet both groups were responding to the same environment of tensions, frustrations, and uncertainties. Some elements of this environment spell out previously mentioned factors of political instability in developing societies.

36. *Slow and uneven economic growth.* The pace of economic development for most countries in Latin America has been disappointingly slow as against the requirements for assuring further development and assuaging existing poverty. In addition, some of the countries that have already made substantial progress towards development -- Argentina, in particular -- have suffered the frustrations of a stop-and-go pattern of alternating good and bad years. The average annual rate of economic growth for the twenty republics as a whole during the sixties was less than five percent. Meanwhile, the region has an average rate of population growth of three percent, the fastest of any comparable geographic area. Thus the per capita rate of growth of gross national product has been less than two percent -- modest indeed for "developing countries". During the decade, most of the countries fell still further behind the pace of technological change in the developed world. And in most countries there probably was an increase in the absolute number of persons living under conditions of more-or-less perpetual poverty.

37. *Pace of modernization.* In most of the larger countries, modernization in the form of urbanization has been extremely rapid in recent decades. In 1940 there were five Latin American cities with a million or more inhabitants, and these contained a total of about 10 million people; the comparable figures for 1970 are nearly 20 cities and over 40 million people. Much more so than when tied to the traditional society of the countryside, these new "citizens" constitute a destabilizing force of potentially great magnitude in the political as well as the economic sphere. For example, because urbanization has generally not been fueled by largescale industrialization or any other spur to rapid economic expansion, a staggering proportion of the adult population in the cities lacks steady jobs. In some countries the rate of urban unemployment and underemployment (e.g., rag pickers, lottery peddlers) runs to about 40 percent. In most cases it is difficult for the government in power to command the political loyalty of the urban poor. Many, perhaps most, still are indifferent to national politics, but as the poor become politically active they tend to be attracted to the political groups that promise them the most.

38. *Discontented elites.* Even when various politically-articulate groups agree that it is time for a change and raise similar cries for greater national independence and such, they often cannot agree on a basic program. The radicals, usually students and

other members of the intelligentsia, raise the banner of "Social Justice" and insist upon instant displacement of existing institutions. The military raise the banner of "Order and Progress" and insist upon economic development as the first priority, and upon orderly change.

39. *Nationalism.* Arnold Toynbee observed in 1966 that nationalism in South America had "become a more important religion than Christianity". If anything, nationalism continues to grow more pervasive and intense. Much of it is now directed against the unquestionable presence and real and imagined influence of United States interests, but it takes its toll against private enterprise generally. Since nationalism has become everyone's issue, it can be exploited by groups from far right to far left across the entire political spectrum, often at some cost to political peace.

40. *Exogenous influences.* Latin American elites are reminded of their shortcomings by the examples of developed societies, capitalistic and socialistic. Latin America's revolutionaries are reminded of their timidity by such examples as Cuba and Algeria. Latin America's religious leaders are reminded of their responsibility for the oppressive social conditions of their flock (more than one-third of the world's Roman Catholics) by their counterparts in Europe and North America.

III. THE RECORD OF THE SIXTIES: INSURGENCIES AND COUPS

41. More so than any change in frequency, changes in the causes and kinds of political violence in Latin America seem to set the sixties apart from the record of previous decades. Whereas guerrilla insurgencies had been rare before Castro's campaign, more than a score of attempts to duplicate that success were mounted during the 1960s. None did, though several still are in the field trying. There were also more than a score of attempted military coups; 17 succeeded in altering the presidential succession, affecting 10 countries. These coup statistics are somewhat lower than the average for the 1940s and 1950s. But much more significant, in Brazil, Argentina, and Peru -- respectively the first, third, and fifth most populous of the republics -- the coups of the sixties led to the establishment of direct rule by the military as an institution on a more or less indefinite basis.

A. The Revolutionary Insurgencies

42. Most of the attempts at insurgency by revolutionary groups proved feeble and shortlived: They were more a statement of the perpetrators' quixotic enthusiasm than of any real ability to coerce their country into a revolutionary channel. But there were more potent campaigns as well, that at least for a time seriously threatened either the stability of the country or the government's control

over certain districts. These included Colombia, Guatemala, Venezeula, and towards the end of the decade, Uruguay.

43. For the purposes of this Paper, perhaps the key questions to be addressed regarding the revolutionary insurgencies are why they were so numerous during the sixties, and why they failed or foundered. The factors inspiring the insurgency campaigns were many and intertwined and have been mentioned at least in passing earlier in the Paper: the Latin American tradition of seeking political ends through violent means; the existence of groups of radicals, mainly students and young professionals, who were at once idealistic, ambitious, bold, and impatient; a feeling that the regimes in powers were vulnerable -- that the times were right; the example of Castro's success and the assistance he tendered to various groups; and the general lack of alternative roads to power -- peaceful or violent -- for those determined to promote revolutionary changes in policy.

44. The impact of Cuba -- the example, the propaganda, the camps for guerrilla training, the funds and occasionally the weapons and key personnel as well -- was both dramatic and complicated. In most cases it served to expand the number of youthful rebels and to speed their conversion from talking about revolution to taking up arms against the established order. Castro's Cuba, moreover,

strengthened the determination on the part of Latin American radicals to fight for drastic rather than cosmetic changes in society, and encouraged the choice of guerrilla warfare as against other violent alternatives. Nonetheless, many of the insurgents would have engaged in some form of anti-regime warfare irrespective of Castro's existence and encouragement; some of the leaders of guerrilla movements in the 1960s had participated during the fifties in the overthrow of military dictatorships and the establishment of civilian regimes (e.g., in Venezuela). During the sixties the radical groups occasionally tried their hand at mass urban disturbances or military coups before turning to guerrilla warfare. But such moves were usually far beyond the capabilities of the far left radicals. Whatever else may be said about guerrilla campaigns in the countryside as a road to political power in Latin America, they *can be initiated* by a small number of men who have but limited resources and little or no political or popular following.

45. Most of the leaders and organizers of the guerrilla insurgencies are fairly labelled *Castroists*. This is not to imply that Cuba either created or controlled the groups, but rather that the insurgents shared Castro's political objectives and adopted his style of political warfare. Many of the early activists came from the youth wings of established political parties, especially from the orthodox (pro-Moscow) Communist parties. The latter were

generally led by elderly men who were content with their established (if modest) place in the political sun, and professed belief that the *vía pacífica* would eventually lead to revolution, and in any case was much less risky than the *vía armada*. The first insurgents also came from dissident, radical wings of center-left parties, including Venezuela's Democratic Action, which controlled the government for most of the decade.*

46. The leading insurgents were mainly students and young professionals; for the most part lawyers and politicians, but occasionally such others as physicians, soldiers, and clergymen. The insurgent groups also attracted a number of professional adventurers and congenital outlaws. Some of these as well as a number with military backgrounds moved into positions of leadership because of their skill in the art of guerrilla warfare. Thus a few leaders came from relatively humble backgrounds. Most leaders, however, were members of the urban intelligentsia and had elitist or advantaged family backgrounds.

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* *It would seem to me that the term revolutionary would fit those who seek drastic changes in society but does not require that this position be backed up with either violent action or even pressures for radical changes in the short term. Thus, many Latin American Communists, though revolutionaries, would be neither insurgents nor radicals. The revolutionary insurgents would use violence to bring about radical changes. They would be Castroist if they admired Castro's particular style of violence and revolutionary programs.*

47. At times the fielding of a new group of insurgents turned on issues of personal ambition or group rivalry. In essence, the existence of a multitude of competitive, occasionally fratricidal, groups on the far left encouraged the formation of competitive guerrilla movements. In some cases the orthodox Communist parties fielded their own guerrilla groups in order to arrest the loss of youthful members to the Castroist parties and to curb Cuba's criticism that the Communists lacked revolutionary credentials. Pro-Chinese and even Trotskyite groups joined the fray as well, and the competition between encampments in the mountains could mirror that among activist students on the university campuses. At times even these relatively small groups split over issues or personality and ideology, and there were instances in which one guerrilla band engaged another in combat to determine control of the movement.

48. In good part the failure of the revolutionary insurgencies can be traced to the contrast between the circumstances under which Castro operated against Batista in the 1950s and those obtaining in most of the other Latin American countries during the 1960s. The particular course of action called for by the Castro regime, especially in the mid-sixties, served to sharpen the contrast. Two important principles of Cuban propaganda were that the circumstances of Castro's success were not unique in Latin America and that insurgents could create the conditions for the revolutionary

overthrow of the established order even when these did not objectively exist. According to the principal prophets, Che Guevara and Jules Régis Debray, guerrilla warfare, by setting up a nucleus of revolutionary action in the countryside, would polarize the political and military situation nationwide. It would attract broad peasant support, while forcing the government into mistakes that would isolate it politically and weaken it militarily. In time the guerrillas would gain the military strength to defeat the government's demoralized forces. But from the start guerrillas, not politicians, were to direct the revolutionary movement; guerrilla action, not political action, was to dominate the proceedings; and urban-based political groups and the urban masses generally were to be ignored as not sufficiently committed to violent revolution.*

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* *Robert F. Lamberg, "Che in Bolivia: The 'Revolution' that Failed", Problems in Communism (Washington), January 1971, pp. 25-27, explains that three distinct phases in the evolution of Castroist ideology on revolutionary prospects in Latin America can be distinguished. In the first, theory was formulated after the fact to glorify Castro's success against Batista. This is exemplified by Guevara's Guerrilla Warfare, first published in Havana in 1960. In the second phase, the "ideological orbit of Communism" is added to the Castroist ideology. This can be seen in Guevara's Guerrilla Warfare: A Method, published in Havana in 1962. The third phase, the one described in the text, reflected Castro's disdain for the Latin American Communist parties and their general unwillingness to participate in revolutionary insurgencies. This phase is exemplified by Debray's Revolution in the Revolution (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967).*

49. The complex process by which Castro did defeat Batista defies facile explanation. Yet certain points seem clear to most academic analysts.* Many important conditions underlying the success of the insurgency were relatively unique to Cuba, starting with Castro's plenitude of political skills and, equally significant, Batista's dearth of same. Compared to most Latin American countries Cuba was both relatively prosperous and chronically unstable. The extent of official corruption, favoritism, and ineptitude was very considerable, especially as compared to the other economically advanced republics. Just as Batista was usually more engrossed in profitable and personal diversions than in governmental problems, his military and police chiefs -- conditioned by cronyism and corruption -- were neither greatly interested nor skilled in their professional duties. Still another factor was the considerable extent of popular participation in the national political process, peaceful and violent, especially as compared with the other small and chronically unstable republics.

50. Castro's major tactical objective, following Batista's seizure of power in 1952, had been to deliver a *golpe* of his own by storming a key military installation or urban center. He and his small band of desperate men took up guerrilla warfare in the

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* *A most useful analysis is Hugh Thomas, Cuba or the Pursuit of Freedom (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1971), especially Chapter 85.*

the Sierra Maestra in 1956 only after their plans for a direct assault for power had been thwarted by Batista's forces. Because of their initial weakness, during their early months in the field, the *golpistas*-turned-*guerrilleros* engaged more in hiding and in seeking support from urban-based political groups than in armed combat.

51. In fact, during the most active period of the insurgency (1957-1958), Castro's guerrillas were only one of several political groups engaged in using violence to unseat the Batista dictatorship. A major part of the polarization that wore away Batista's support and augmented the ranks of his opposition was provoked by bands of urban terrorists, some independent of, others only loosely aligned with Castro's movement. In time the anti-Batista forces represented a broad range of politically-active Cubans. The partisan resistance was led mostly by students and young professionals. But these were able to gain a legion of recruits from among urban workers and peasants on the one hand, and financial support and smuggled arms from certain wealthy politicians and businessmen on the other.

52. Perhaps Castro's most important contribution was to stand defiant (amidst intense publicity at home and abroad) as a "remote but unifying national symbol" of the anti-Batista struggle. His remarkable political skill enabled him to keep diverse and competitive opposition groups committed to the struggle more or less behind

his leadership. Because Castro's own political views were only loosely formed at the time, and because his skill at telling opposition leaders what they wanted to hear about his future political plans was quite advanced, he came across to most of the partisans as a suitable leader for a post-Batista coalition government. Few expected either a totalitarian or a revolutionary regime. In a sense then Batista was overthrown more by the politics of political violence than by the actual combat.* The coalition of political forces behind his regime began to crumble as the resistance groups provoked him into draconian security measures, which not only failed to staunch the insurgency but also sped his political isolation. Groups that had opportunistically supported his regime began to search for some new constellation of political forces under which to ply their special interests. The end came quickly when the United States withdrew its support of Batista in December 1958. This act sapped the remaining morale of Batista's forces, greatly encouraged the partisans (now relieved of fears that US intervention would somehow save Batista), and sprung many of the remaining fence-sitters -- including the Cuban Communist party -- into the opposition camp.

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* *Thomas, op.cit. p. 1040, estimates that Batista's losses in the war against Castro were probably no more than 300 men, from an army of more than 30,000.*

53. Castro's broad initial popularity in Cuba, in 1959, was matched elsewhere in Latin America, among moderates as well as radicals. The range of his appeal shrank sharply during the early 1960s as his regime proved to be radical and revolutionary, totalitarian as well as dictatorial (the elimination of political factions probably alarmed former wellwishers more than the elimination of elections), and closely-bound to the Soviet Union. Both Castro and Guevara have made the point that they had an advantage over subsequent Latin American insurgencies in that bourgeois forces in Cuba and in the United States were confused as to where their interests lay during the anti-Batista struggle. The later insurgencies, in contrast, were self-defined as radical and revolutionary from the start. Moderate and conservative forces, especially the ruling elements at home and the US government, were forewarned. Thus the insurgencies in their formative stages had little chance of gaining broad political support, or of being ignored or tolerated as unimportant by the government.

54. In a sense the subsequent insurgencies suffered for the lack of another Castro. While some of the leaders were perhaps his superior as military tactician, none could match his skill at political warfare. But perhaps even more important, there was not to be another Batista -- both ineffective and unpopular, failing

either to isolate the guerrillas politically or to bloody them militarily.* The regimes under attack fought back with a combination of moves, including, in most cases, at least a minimum of political finesse and attention to strengthening the combat abilities of the military and police through US assistance. The dominant character of the responses in fact ranged from a superb campaign of political isolation in Venezuela to a brutal counter-terror campaign in Guatemala.

55. Usually the process of political isolation was simple enough. The guerrilla leaders, as a rule, were urban and urbane in character and both national and ideological in political approach. This alone set them apart from the great bulk of *campesinos*, who were cautious if not outright conservative -- married as it were to the everyday practical problems of survival in the *patria chica* (village), with little time or thought for the problems and prospects of the *patria grande*. By and large they preferred to keep the little they had in life rather than risk it in battle against the *patrón* and his army. They believed it wiser to hope that those in power would grow more benign, rather than struggle to alter the hierarchy of things. Even where the peasants had already been

* *A Colombian guerrilla leader once explained his lack of success by observing that "we needed a Batista but had a Lleras" (referring to the then President Lleras Restrepo).*

politicized (as in Venezuela where they had been organized by the center-left political parties), they tended to look upon the revolutionary insurgents as aliens. In most cases the peasants probably would have preferred not to take sides; but when they did they usually favored the army with the information and cooperation needed to hunt down the guerrillas.

56. The process of military combat was often just as straightforward. Even armies that had little combat experience, and perhaps little staying power if matters got rough, were not much tested by guerrilla groups that had no combat experience and faced great difficulties in taking root. A number of insurgency groups were wiped out soon after they surfaced as combatants. Soon after taking power in 1959, Castro sponsored or sanctioned filibustering expeditions to Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti that were destroyed or dispersed upon landing (a fate Castro narrowly escaped when he landed in Cuba, from Mexico, in 1956). Attempts by revolutionaries to field groups in northern Argentina (1963), southern Brazil (1964), and central Peru (1965) lasted only for the time it took for the military to reach and comb the combat zone. The fighting phase of Guevara's famous guerrilla adventure in Bolivia (1967) lasted little more than six months.

57. Each of the insurgencies, in truth, was characterized by a unique combination of features, in terms not only of the political and military responses of the host government, but also of the general state of politics, the personal and group dynamics on the revolutionary left, the role of Cuba and the local Communist party, the choice of battleground, and popular reactions both in general and in the combat zone.*

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58. *Urban Terrorism.* Che Guevara's failure in Bolivia underscored the futility of artificially inseminated guerrilla campaigns in the countryside and sped the movement among revolutionary insurgents towards concentration on warfare in their home grounds through campaigns of urban terrorism. Such campaigns of course had been integral parts of the revolutionary warfare in both Venezuela and Guatemala during the early 1960s. While the disruptive effect had been very considerable, at least in Venezuela the urban warfare had tended to alienate the general public without seriously weakening the government or enhancing the revolutionary prospects of the insurgent forces. For the most part the urban guerrillas in the late 1960s

* *The original text contains sketches of the campaigns in Bolivia, Colombia, Guatemala, Peru, and Venezuela, following para. 57; and of those in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, the D.R., and Uruguay, following para. 58.*

faced similar problems; they carried their campaigns into the early seventies still in need of a strategy to convert their powerful capacity for disruption into a revolutionary force.

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B. The Military Coups

59. As with the revolutionary insurgencies, each of the military coups during the 1960s was characterized by unique circumstances, including various combinations of *push* from within the military establishments for power and perquisites and *pull* from either the societies at large or the political systems in distress. From 1960 through 1969 there were 17 military coups that either led to a period of military rule or otherwise affected the presidential succession. Several coup attempts were quashed when the bulk of the security forces remained loyal to the government; e.g., in Venezuela in 1960-1962. And of course a large

number of plots seeded by one or another discontented military faction aborted in the formative stages.*

60. Some optimistic observers had hoped that the advent of the 1960s would give rise to an era of relatively low profile for the military in politics in Latin America. Indeed, there appeared to be a "Twilight of the Tyrants" as a consequence of the removal from power of most of the military strongmen of the 1950s: General Perón in Argentina, General Rojas Pinilla in Colombia, General Batista in Cuba, General Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, General Pérez Jiménez in Venezuela. Yet by the end of the decade, military

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* *The actual number of successful coups depends upon how many marginal cases are included. The present total of 17 is derived as follows:*

Argentina (two): the overthrow of President Frondizi in 1962, and of President Illia in 1966; Bolivia (two): the overthrow of President Paz Estenssoro in 1964, and of President Salinas in 1969; Brazil (two): the military's limitation of President Goulart's executive powers in 1961, and the overthrow of Goulart in 1964; Dominican Republic (two): the overthrow of President Bosch in 1963, and of the Reid Cabral government in 1965; Ecuador (two): the overthrow of President Velasco in 1961, and of President Arosemena in 1963; Guatemala (one): the overthrow of President Ydígoras in 1963; Honduras (one): the overthrow of President Villeda in 1963; Panama (one): the overthrow of President Arias in 1968; Peru (two): the overthrow of President Prado in 1962, and of President Belaunde in 1968; El Salvador (two): the overthrow of the Lemus government in 1960, and of the resultant military junta in 1961.

influence in politics had rebounded strongly. The military as an institution ruled more or less directly in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Panama, and Peru; while in the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and El Salvador the President of the Republic was either a military officer or a civilian more or less regularly concerned about the political temperament of the armed forces. The military also play a prominent role in Cuba, where it is difficult to decide whether Castro is essentially a military or civilian ruler. Chile, Colombia, Uruguay, and perhaps Venezuela now have fairly well established traditions of civilian domination of the military, though in periods of acute political stress concern about possible military intervention can still arise, as was the case during the presidential elecitons of 1970 in both Chile and Colombia. That would leave Mexico which has a firmly established tradition of civilian domination and Costa Rica which disbanded its military forces some 20 years ago.

61. One common thread of the political preoccupation of the variously constituted military establishments of Latin America during the 1960s was fear of uncontrolled political and social change that could endanger their perquisites and residual political influence on the one hand, and their view of the national security and welfare on the other. Still worse, perhaps, from the military point of view in many countries would be rapid and radical change directed by civilian

politicians and groups considered to be the enemy of the military, and by extension the enemy of the people. In a way, the example of Cuba, where the Castro regime destroyed the old military establishment and executed a large number of senior officers, depicted the ultimate disaster to be avoided. These concerns, of course, were sometimes conceived of and invariably paraded in terms of the national interest. In some cases, especially in the smaller, less sophisticated republics, fear of revolutionary violence and of revolutionary successes and excesses caused the military, when they intervened, to cling to the old ways more tightly than ever. But in a number of countries, especially the larger ones, where the military establishments were relatively more professional and sophisticated, these same fears and concerns propelled the military into the role of directing and monitoring the course of change.

62. In the smaller republics, where the military and most other institutions are still characterized by a high degree of personalism and a correspondingly low degree of professionalism, the bulk of the military coups turned around that most threatening of political events -- the national election. In 1963, in both Guatemala and Honduras the military cast out the incumbent civilian government to preempt the scheduled presidential election, which the military feared would elevate to power an "unacceptable" candidate. In Guatemala the feared candidate was former president Juan

José Arévalo, whose previous administration (1945-1951) had been decidedly to the left by Guatemalan standards, and who (in 1963) was suspected by the military of pre-Communist and pro-Castroist tendencies. In Honduras the leading candidates had pledged to organize a popular militia to counteract the political influence of the military. In both countries, after a period of military rule, elections for a new president were once again held, though this in no way signaled a general retreat from a large political role by the military.

63. In the Dominican Republic in 1963 the military overthrew President Juan Bosch, seven months after he took office. Conservatives in and out of the military feared that the Bosch administration -- both through its reformist policies and its ineptitude -- would undermine their special interests and at the same time open the way for general political tumult and increased Communist influence. In Panama in 1968 President Arnulfo Arias was cast out of office by the National Guard eight *days* after his inauguration. This was the third time he had been elected President, only to be sent packing via a coup. The predominant reason was fear within the National Guard that Arias intended a reorganization to place friendly officers in charge and otherwise reduce the independence of the military.

64. Even in the smaller republics the issue was not always that of a conservative military versus a reformist civilian administration. General Omar Torrijos, ruling as head of the Panamanian National Guard, has demonstrated hostile attitudes towards the conservative elite groups that have traditionally dominated the country, and he has attempted to introduce reform programs to assist the lower classes, including the lower middle class from which he springs. In Ecuador in 1963 the military ousted President Carlos Julio Arosemena largely because of his public displays of drunkenness. Once in office the military attempted to introduce a series of reform measures that were quite forwardlooking for this conservative and elitist republic. For their troubles, the military were thrown out of office in 1966 by a countercoup sponsored by the much concerned Guayaquil Chamber of Commerce.

65. Factionalism within the military and changes in the dominant current of military thought were also complicating factors. President Arosemena had been put into office by the military in 1961, succeeding from the vice-presidency when the military overthrew President José Mariá Velasco Ibarra. In El Salvador, the military coup of September 1960 threw over a conservative military ruler; when the newly constituted junta proved too radical for the dominant group in the military, a new coup in January 1961 established a moderate-reformist junta. The 1965 civil war in the

Dominican Republic was precipitated when pro-Bosch military officers overthrew the civilian-directed junta (Reid Cabral) established by the more conservative officers after their 1963 overthrow of Bosch.

66. One thing the record of the 1960s makes clear is that the professionalization of the armed forces in the larger and relatively more sophisticated countries did not in itself quash the military's drive to intervene in politics. Certain trends can be perceived as these countries underwent the processes of economic development and mdoernization. As the civilian institutions became stronger and more professional, so indeed did the military, with its high command taking on the character of a corporate board of directors rather than, as formerly, a cabal of charismatic soldiers of fortune. But then, the very processes of modernization and the usually rocky course of economic development ushered in new tensions and crises that greatly taxed, and at times overwhelmed, the cohesion and flexibility of the political system. Meanwhile, in their efforts to base promotions on merit and to keep up with the complexities of the modern world, the military had been sending senior officers to schools of advanced studies, whose courses cover the requirements of national security from the point of view of economic and political problems and "solutions". The new military, now increasingly technocratic as well as bureaucratic, judged the performance of the civilian leadership

by more sophisticated standards than formerly, and when they found it wanting, they were ready once again to step in to set things right.

67. This is more or less the rationale behind the military governments now ruling in Brazil (since 1964), Argentina (since 1966), and Peru (since 1968). It is obviously an idealized and self-serving interpretation, but not for what it includes as much as for what it omits. In each case the military were concerned about a growing political malaise, mounting economic difficulties, and rising social tensions that they saw as threats both to the prospects for national development and to the integrity of the national character and institutions. They believed that ineptitude and excessive partisanship on the part of civilian political leaders, as well as the selfishness and shortsightedness of the social and economic elites generally, could produce an uncontrolled collapse of the existing social order and open the way to power to unprincipled extremist groups and demagogues. The military, moreover, believed that they had the training, institutional structure, and will to put into effect the changes needed to spur national development and progress without undue disorder and disruption.

68. But in all three countries there was also fear (if not also hatred) of a particular political group whose actual or prospective control of the government threatened the independent role

of the military as arbiter of the national interest: The Peronists in Argentina, the political heirs of dictator Getúlio Vargas in Brazil (i.e., the *Getulistas*), and the *Apristas* in Peru (supporters of perennial presidential candidate Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre). Moreover, there were individual officers, including some prominent in the early stages of coup plotting, who were interested in enhancing their personal status or power through a change of government. Although these elements of *push* are also part of the story, the following sketches of the major military regimes emphasize the elements of *pull* that brought the military to power and the programs and problems that have characterized their rule.*

IV. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS

69. In all the major instances of political violence in Latin America during the 1960s, there was present some noteworthy foreign aspect, at least of indirect influence if not also of direct involvement. Yet only rarely did the foreign element appear to be the decisive one in the outcome of the affair. Foreign influence and intervention could and did affect the timing, character, and course of a revolutionary insurgency or military coup, but the

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* *Country studies of Argentina, Brazil, and Peru are omitted in this version.*

relative political skill and strength of the domestic adversaries almost always determined the outcome. This was particularly true in South America where the remoteness of the battlegrounds and the complexity of domestic institutions tended to raise the cost and lower the effectiveness of attempts at intervention by foreign parties directed against the control and policies of the ruling governments and elites.

70. Admittedly, it often is extremely difficult to separate domestic from foreign elements in a political crisis. This would especially be the case in the smaller and relatively less sophisticated republics of the Caribbean, where the behavior of domestic contestants for power is at times heavily conditioned by their awareness of the overwhelming might and ubiquitous interests of the United States, not to mention the past record of intervention in local affairs by the "Colossus of the North".

71 While the United States is much less omnipresent in most South American countries, even here it almost always is engaged at least indirectly in major political crises, if only because the key domestic participants assume (often with exaggeration) that the wishes and actions of one or another of the multitude of groups representing US interests will affect the outcome. Thus the domestic adversaries tend to move either to assure the benefit to their cause

or to counteract the harm from anticipated US moves. One scholarly study of political crises during the early and mid-1960s has described the impact of the United States on the "decisional environment" in Latin America as follows:*

> One need not subscribe to classical economic theories of imperialism to appreciate that most Latin American countries are extremely vulnerable to penetration by men, money, and ideas from the United States. Certain characteristics of Latin American economies . . ., the beliefs of substantial segments of the politically relevant population . . ., and the weakness and paucity of developmental cadres and entrepreneurial talent lead easily to dependence relationships with the United States. Even were the United States not partially responsible for the conditions that have led to this dependence, the overwhelming political, economic, military, and cultural hegemony of the United States within the hemisphere would assure much the same situation. So massive is this hegemony, that were accurate measures available, we would probably find that no two Latin American nations are as directly linked politically, economically, technologically, militarily, and culturally with each other as with the United States. Expressed differently, for all Latin American nations (including Cuba in a special sense) the "most significant *other*" is the United States.

72. In the most general sense, then whatever the United States *does* or *does not do* in the midst of a political crisis is likely to have some impact on its course and character -- again especially in the smaller, historically more dependent Caribbean republics. John Bartlow Martin, former US Ambassador to the

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* *Fagen and Cornelius, op. cit., p. 407.*

Dominican Republic, has described how active interposition by the United States stayed the hand of military plotters against President Juan Bosch during the early part of his seven month term of office. According to Ambassador Martin, when reports of an impending military coup arose once again in September 1963, he was instructed by the State Department not to intervene on the grounds that Bosch would somehow have to save his own skin sooner or later. The United States, therefore, did not interpose its will against that of the military plotters, and the coup came on swiftly and, for the moment, bloodlessly.*

73. Thus, despite this pervasive presence as a willing or unwilling participant in Latin American crises, the wishes and actions of the United States are rarely the decisive factor in the outcome -- unless the local forces are in close and precarious balance, or unless the United States is willing and able to undertake massive and direct intervention. For good reasons or bad the United States government wished the more conservative forces to triumph in the bloody civil war that erupted in the Dominican Republic some 18 months after Bosch's ouster. Small and indirect favors could not turn the tide of battle; only the intervention of a large US military force did.

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* *John Bartlow Martin, Overtaken by Events (NY: Doubleday, 1966).*

74. It is clear, moreover, that the actual influence of the United States on Latin American affairs in general and crises of political violence in particular diminished as the decade proceeded and the force of Latin American nationalism expanded, and with it the general discontent with the US hegemony over hemispheric relationships. Perhaps this trend was most clearly illustrated by the declining ability of the United States to influence the timing and direction of military coups. As previously indicated, the direct participation of the Latin American military in national politics is a basic indigenous institution, and not an episodic aberration or a foreign transplant. This is not to gainsay US influence, assiduously cultivated, over most of the Latin American military establishments. But *influence* does not spell *control*, especially when the local military establishment's interpretation of the national interest pushes or pulls it in a direction opposite to the advice proffered, openly or privately, by representatives of the US government. Indeed, most of the military coups during the decade represented an embarrassment to the United States and a setback to official policy. Then again, the coups in Panama and Peru in 1968 and in Bolivia in 1969-1970 produced military governments that were distinctly more hostile to close cooperation with US interests than the governments that previously had ruled in these countries.

75. In the infrequent instances when the United States appeared to welcome a military coup -- most notably in Brazil in 1964 -- this fact probably facilitated the execution of the coup. When Washington decided it no longer could cooperate with the Goulart administration, the reduction of economic assistance and the other evidence of estrangement contributed to the polarization of political forces that precipitated the coup. In time, private assurances of a resumption of close relations were no doubt exchanged between representatives of the US government and the military and civilian plotters. The decisive factor by far, however, was the perception by most of the senior military officers and by a broad spectrum of influential civilian groups of the danger to their special interests and to the national welfare posed by Goulart's policies. Put another way, once the military and civilian elites decided that Goulart had to be removed from office, it would have taken a massive and direct intervention by the United States to have stayed the coup for long -- doubtless many times the number of troops used in the Dominican intervention the following year.

76. In most cases, US assistance to the governments engaged in countering a revolutionary insurgency was facilitated by the relative political isolation of the insurgents and the reasonably strong public mandate for the government under attack to eradicate them. The equipment, training, and advice -- to military, police,

and intelligence forces -- was instrumental in defeating or containing the insurgencies, but it probably was not the decisive factor in any country. The revolutionaries simply lacked the strength to overthrow the established order. Even in Bolivia, where the security forces were particularly ineffective to start, Guevara's forces were close to exhaustion, if not also to defeat, when the army units benefitting from US assistance closed in for the kill.

77. For most Latin American countries, Cuba was probably the second most important *other* (after the United States) during the 1960s. Not only did Castro's example and assistance encourage a host of revolutionary insurgencies, but the events in Cuba reshaped the parameters of the political dialogue generally. The record of the sixties would show, nonetheless, that it is extremely difficult to "export a revolution", especially by a country with Cuba's limited resources. In a sense, Castro could neither convert the doubting by turning his own revolution into a showcase of solutions for Latin American problems nor adequately fund his foreign disciples so as to tip the local balance of forces to their favor.

78. To some extent the Cuban attempt to intervene in the affairs of neighboring countries appeared to work to the net disadvantage of revolutionary forces. Castro's promotion of guerrilla

insurgencies exacerbated fractional conflicts among the forces on the far left, and stimulated a greater defensive effort by the endangered elites and by the United States (in terms of assistance to Latin American security forces). Meanwhile, evidence of Cuban intervention, which was most blatant in Venezuela and Bolivia, appeared to incerase the political mandate for a government crackdown on radical forces generally and for the acceptance of US assistance towards the end.

79. One reason that Castro has so little to show for his efforts was the lack of positive support on the part of the Soviet Union. Indeed for most of the decade Soviet-Cuban differences on the issue of promotion of the revolutionary insurgencies created an intense strain in their relationship generally. The Castro position was that insurgencies had to be encouraged in all countries, no matter what the attitude of the local Communist party. Castro was motivated by a combination of factors, including the feeling that a "Second Cuba" was important to the survival of his regime, and the drive to establish his credentials as a revolutioanry leader in his own right by manifesting his independence of Soviet domination. The vituperative clashes with the Soviet Union reached a height during 1966-1967, when the Venezuelan Communist Party, with Soviet blessing, renounced the *vía armada* and abandoned the Castroist MIR. Starting in 1968, however, and continuing into the early 1970s, Castro appeared

gradually and grudgingly to accept the Soviet position that guerrilla insurgencies were only one of several possible roads for revolutionary forces to follow. Castro was probably influenced, on the one hand, by his continuing heavy dependence upon Soviet economic and military assistance; and, on the other hand, by the failure of the guerrilla insurgencies (especially Guevara's in Bolivia) and by the success of "progressive forces" through such means as military coup in Peru and presidential election in Chile. Although Castro's conversion would probably be sorely tested by the emergence of promising new insurgent groups, his assistance to the ongoing insurgencies did appear to decline noticeably during the last years of the 1960s.

80. For a time in the early sixties, the Soviet Union, or at least Premier Kruschchev, appeared to be more open to a bold course in Latin America. Castro's willingness to denounce Cuba's historic ties to the United States and his self-proclaimed adherence to the Communist bloc apparently caught the Soviet Union by surprise. Previously the Soviets had concluded that the US hegemony over Latin America was relatively impregnable, certainly over the short term. But in a major policy statement, in January 1961, expressing Soviet support of "wars of national liberation" against "corrupt, reactionary regimes", as well as against colonial powers, Kruschchev gave special prominence to Castro's success and spoke of a dramatic weakening of US domination over Latin America in general. The extent of

Soviet support to Cuba in the early 1960s, including military support, may in part have been related to the perception of an opportunity throughout Latin America to reduce the US position sharply and quickly.

81. But after the sobering experience of the missile crisis of 1962, the Soviet Union reverted to a basically cautious and pragmatic policy in regard to supporting revolutionary insurgencies in Latin America. For the most part the Soviet Union concentrated instead on a program of increasing its influence gradually through an expansion of state-to-state relations. The role Moscow saw for the local Communist parties (and which most of the local party leaders readily accepted) was as part of the "progressive" bloc of political forces working towards changes in society and foreign policy through legitimate means. This course required a dexterous discretion when it came to Soviet support of violent revolution. As Castro was to charge, the Soviet Union placed its national interests above its commitment to promote World Revolution as an end in itself. The intermediate goals of building Soviet prestige (and also covert assets) while at the same time encouraging a decline in US influence were substituted for serious advocacy of the ultimate goal of revolutionary destruction of the old order (the only goal that Castro recognized).

82. The Soviet policy enjoyed a certain measure of success even before its stunning vindication in Chile in 1970, which saw the election of a Marxist government with strong Communist party participation. At the start of the 1960s the Soviet Union had had diplomatic relations only with Argentina, Mexico, and Uruguay. Cuba was added in 1960, and then followed all of the South American republics save Paraguay: Brazil in 1961; Chile in 1965; Colombia in 1968; Peru in 1969; and Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela in 1970. Promotion of lines of trade and aid as well as cultural exchanges also characterized the Soviet approach. And although both economic and diplomatic relations were characterized by a considerable caution, they did demonstrate the new reach of the Soviet Union as a worldwide power. Interestingly enough, the Soviets worked to keep all established lines open, even when military governments came to power that used stringent, at times draconian, measures against local revolutionary forces (e.g., Brazil).

83. The Soviet Union's decision to concentrate on promoting the *via pacifica* involved a series of calculations in addition to its satisfaction with the seeming success of the policy of building influence through state relations. These included the low priority assigned to Latin America as an arena for a dramatic breakthrough in influence as compared to other arenas of Soviet interest, such

as the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. The Soviets, in addition, held a very high respect for the ability of the United States to bring great power to bear when and where it chose during a crisis in Latin America. The Soviets apparently concluded that with the available assets the *vía armada* would prove counterproductive if not also suicidal for the local Communists. In general, the Soviets believed that time was on their side, that the historical tide of the US hegemony in Latin America was running out on the basis of local factors and would continue to do so without the assumption, by the Soviet Union, of great costs or risks. Thus, although the Soviet Union did support revolutionary violence when the local party took the initiative -- as from time to time in Colombia, Guatemala, and Venezuela -- by the end of the decade it had accepted (if not also encouraged) a damping down of the insurgencies and the establishment of state relations with Colombia and Venezuela.

84. I have mentioned the missile crisis of 1962 as a turning point in Soviet policy towards Latin America. While any detailed assessment of the missile crisis would lie beyond the scope of this Paper, some observations on the triangle of US-Cuban-Soviet relations in the early 1960s could serve to underscore the unique characteristics that set the international aspects of this crisis apart from those of the general course of political violence in Latin America during the decade. Whatever may be said in the light of the

values of the early 1970s, the course of US policy towards Cuba in the early 1960s appeared solidly grounded in the then historical and contemporary values of US foreign policy. These included the 130-year quest, under the Monroe Doctrine and its corollaries, to exclude extra-hemispheric powers from the exercise of influence over the affairs of the Caribbean republics; the 60 years of US intervention, direct and indirect, in Cuban political affairs; and the more than 10 years of the anti-Communist standard of the Cold War.

85. Thus the US government, despite the dissent of some officials, came to interpret Castro's strident anti-US policies and his grasping for economic, political, and military ties with the Communist countries as a damaging blow to US prestige and national interests and as a potentially major danger to its national security. The argument that Castro was propelled to his course by deep resentment of past US intervention and fear of future ones seemed beside the point to most Washington officials and political leaders.* US organization and training of a force of anti-Castro

* *Presidential aspirant John F. Kennedy, writing in April 1960, stressed that Castro had betrayed the ideals of his own revolution by transforming Cuba into a "hostile and militant Communist satellite."*

Cuban exiles was begun in 1960 under the Eisenhower administration; the ill-fated assault against the Bay of Pigs was dispatched in April 1961 under the Kennedy administration. This attempt at "export of counter-revolution" proved a dismal failure for a multitude of reasons, not the least of which were underestimating Castro's hold on his country and overestimating the ability of the exiles to do the job without major participation in the assault by US military forces.

86. In the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs episode, Castro's hold on Cuba and his prestige elsewhere in Latin America were further enhanced. His petitions to the Soviet Union for additional military support were strengthened, or at the least the Soviet willingness to risk a growing military involvement in Cuba was strengthened. Finally the level of Soviet influence in Cuba, including the size of the Soviet military presence that the United States was forced to tolerate, was appreciably enlarged. But President Kennedy made it clear that his government drew the line at "offensive weapons" -- those by which an attack on the United States could be launched from Cuba. Offensive nuclear missiles would not be tolerated.

87. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union, for complex and still partly obscure reasons -- military, political, diplomatic -- installed intermediate and medium range missiles in Cuba. Kruschchev

apparently was surprised by the forcefulness of the US response and the sharp drawing of alternatives for the Soviet Union: on the one hand, either conventional war in the Caribbean or allout nuclear war, neither of which Moscow was prepared to risk; on the other hand, a rather humiliating withdrawal of the offending weapons, which Moscow accepted. At least in retrospect it seems clear that Kruschchev misjudged not only President Kennedy's character in a crisis but also the range of options he faced as President of the United States. It can be argued that the introduction of Soviet missiles into Cuba did not in itself alter the strategic balance of military power that favored the United States over the Soviet Union, or in any other way directly threaten US survival and security. As one authority put it -- the stakes were "primarily a matter of prestige, propaganda, and politics" . These, however, were fine and porous distinctions from the President's point of view. A serious (perhaps *humiliating*) loss of prestige abroad and of confidence at home, while the Antagonist gained greatly in prestige and confidence -- surely the way the Kennedy administration saw the stakes -- was hard to separate, then as now, from a major setback to the national security.

88. In any case the US victory in the missile crisis was considerably qualified, by the standards of the early 1960s. The Soviet Union was permitted to maintain a position of considerable

influence over a small Caribbean republic, including a substantial conventional military presence; Castro's freedom to pursue policies inimical to US interests elsewhere in Latin America were not much curbed. In extending a pledge not to invade Cuba as a *quid pro quo* for Soviet withdrawal of the "offensive weapons", the US, in effect, was accepting a distinct reduction of its traditional hegemonic powers over the Western Hemisphere. The US government apparently recognized that Soviet "prestige, propaganda, and politics" were also heavily engaged in Cuba, and therefore decided not to risk pushing its victory in the world's first nuclear crisis too hard for too much.

89. From the point of view of the US government qua protector of its position of power in the Western Hemisphere, then, its earlier reaction to the conversion of Cuba from a quasi-dependency to a self-proclaimed Communist state with military ties to the Soviet Union had been a case of too little-too late. While the missile crisis itself was favorably resolved, future direct action against the Castro regime was limited by the recognition of a substantial Soviet stake in its survival. Reasoning along lines such as these was probably one of the key influences on the US reaction to the civil war in the Dominican Republic in April 1965, in which the United States moved quickly, massively, and essentially unilaterally to void any prospect of a "Second Cuba".

90. As previously indicated, after the September 1963 coup against President Bosch, the military turned the government over to a junta, presided over by a conservative businessman, Donald Reid Cabral. By 1965 the Reid government had managed to antagonize most of the important political factions, including the conservative military officers and the pro-Bosch forces in and out of the army. The civil war was set off by a coup against Reid by pro-Bosch junior officers. This force soon adopted the name "Constitutionalist", and attracted civilian supporters ranging from political moderates to members of the country's several fractious and minuscule Communist parties. After some hesitation, the conservative military forces fought back for control. Both sides turned to the US Embassy for support -- testimony to the extent of past US intervention in Dominican affairs. The Embassy, and soon thereafter the government in Washington, decided it was essential to block the Constitutionalists from power, because of concern that the Communists and Castroists would stand some chance of seizing control of the movement. When a Constitutionalist victory appeared imminent, therefore, the United States dispatched a large force of troops to terminate the military phase of the civil war and to open the way for a negotiated political settlement under US supervision (though titularly under the supervision of the Organization of American States). Resistance by extremists and diehards was

quashed by the "Loyalist" Dominican military, now emboldened by the presence of US forces.

91. A multitude of views, mostly critical, have been expressed on whether the US intervention was necessary, wise, and properly executed. Much depends on alternative interpretations of the role the United States should play towards political violence in the Caribbean, and of the course Dominican politics would have followed if the United States had not intervened in so direct and massive a manner. In terms of the fundamental problems of Dominican development over the long term, little was accomplished by the US intervention. But in terms of the immediate US goal of averting a risk to its national interests judged to be unacceptable, the intervention was "successful". The Castro regime had a large emotional stake in the Dominican civil war; it complained bitterly about the US intervention in Havana and at the UN, but took no provocative action. The Soviet Union, with no stake and perhaps limited interest, made all of the obvious debater's points about the iniquity and provocation of US action, but it too saw no point in becoming involved, once the US had demonstrated the extent of its concern.

92. The Dominican intervention, along with the much more important Vietnam War, did contribute also to an increased

expression within the United States against the foreign policy of acting as "World Policeman" and defender of friendly (basically conservative) governments and political forces. This was one of the factors underlying the cautious and pragmatic US reaction to the staunchly anti-US stance of the military government in Peru following the 1968 coup. In addition to the changing times and values, there were other obvious differences that set the Dominican and Peruvian cases apart. Peru was *not* in the Caribbean. Because of the external unity of the military establishment and the regime's successful manipulation of the rallying cry of nationalism, there was neither a civil war nor even a crisis atmosphere in Lima. One additional factor is also worth noting. From the point of view of the US government the Peruvian military regime was judged to represent a formidable political force whose nationalism served to protect against the kind of vacuum that swept the Castro regime into the Soviet orbit. Thus, the anti-US policies -- however unpleasant to the US interests directly in the firing line -- were judged not likely to provide open-ended opportunities for an increase in Soviet influence. The Peruvian regime itself repeatedly asserted its rejection of Communism per se as well as of undue influence on Peruvian affairs by *any* foreign power. The US government in recognizing the extent to which Peru's nationalism was a native product, seemed also to recognize that the anti-US

direction of the nationalism was a native reaction against the previously ubiquitous presence of US interests, and not the product of a foreign conspiracy. However irrational from a US interpretation of Peruvian national interests this nationalism might seem, the United States was prepared to try to live with it, and to seek new terms -- if possible -- for renewed cooperation.

93. The Soviet Union has in fact moved cautiously to see to what extent it might increase its influence in Peru. Diplomatic relations were established in 1969, and a search for mutually satisfactory terms for some large economic aid projects was begun. For their part, the Peruvian military, with some exceptions, seem to approach any increase in relations with the Soviet Union as a risky proposition that has to be justified on the basis of clear advantages to Peru.

V. CONCLUSIONS

94. The central thesis of this Paper has been that political violence -- the use of coercion in domestic politics -- is a fundamental part of the political system in most Latin American countries. As a consequence, important groups with a major stake in the preservation of the general political and social system utilize violence to manipulate that system -- to protect special interests, solve national problems, exit from political impasses, control the pace and direction of change. Political violence is therefore not the exclusive province of revolutionaries bent on destroying the system. The practitioners of political violence from within the center of political power -- especially the military establishments -- usually hold great advantages in any contest of "extraconstitutionalism" that tend to block the road to power via violence on the part of small radical groups working from without the center of power. The record of the 1960s: None of the multitude of revolutionary insurgencies succeeded in overthrowing the established order; most of the attempted military coups succeeded in seizing political power, in some cases -- particularly Peru -- to effect far-reaching changes in policy under military control.

95. Despite their failure to achieve political power, or in most cases even to weaken seriously the hold on power of the

established elites, the revolutionary insurgencies had an important impact on the general political milieu in Latin America. Although it is difficult to isolate the impact of the revolutionaries from that of the many other forces for change operating during the decade, they apparently did contribute to the greater urgency of the search for new solutions to old problems on the part of groups close to the center of power, including the military and the Church. In a sense, the nucleus of political and social power, especially in the larger and relatively more sophisticated countries, is shifting from the relative center of the political spectrum towards what formerly would have been considered one or another edge. This may be seen in the growing nationalism of most regimes, civilian and military, including the expansion of state controls and ownership at the expense of private enterprise, domestic and foreign. In some interpretations this is seen as a reaction against European and North American models of either right, center, or left, and a return to the Hispanic and colonial traditions of statism. What is new is the growing awareness that this state power must take greater account of the real and symbolic needs of the general population, if the old centripetal forces of society are not to be overwhelmed altogether. But even where military regimes have overcome both their former aversion to rapid change and the formal constitutional barriers, the magnitude of the problems, the limited resources,

and the conflict over priorities have given rise to other barriers to rapid progress.

96. Although some foreign element was present in the major instances of political violence in Latin America during the 1960s, the domestic balance of political skill and strength was nearly always the decisive factor in the outcome. Castro's help could not transform the generally weak and isolated revolutionary insurgents into strong, let alone successful, contenders for power. US assistance to the governments facing a threat from insurgents was instrumental in blocking their quest for power through the barrel of a gun, but would have been no substitute for governmental determination and political skill. The outstanding exception to the rule was the US intervention in the Dominican crisis of 1965, which reversed the tide of victory which seemed to belong to the Constitutionalists. This exception required a massive intervention by the United States -- including some 20,000 troops.

97. It generally requires a clash of interests between at least two major powers to precipitate a world crisis. Thus, during the 1960s, Cuba was the only likely battleground, especially after the 1962 crisis, which led to a much less adventurous policy on the part of the Soviet Union towards the rest of Latin America. In retrospect, there were probably only two crises that had much chance of turning into a Latin American "Vietnam": The Bay of Pigs,

where the US intervention failed to establish a beachhead; and the Dominican intervention, where the massive US presence discouraged prolonged resistance.

98. Turning briefly to some general remarks on the outlook for the 1970s, it seems simple enough to conclude that political violence will continue to be prevalent throughout most of Latin America. Perhaps it really could not be otherwise given the slowness with which political cultures can change under the best of conditions, the legacy from the 1960s of ongoing revolutionary insurgencies and "irregular" regimes, and the continuation of massive economic and social tensions that are likely to outweigh, if not also overwhelm, the available resources and talent. A lack of consensus among elite groups on priorities and basic direction will in itself underwrite frequent recourse to coercion, in preference to constitutional means, for the resolution of conflicts.

99. Predicting the character and direction of the political violence is another matter. It is challenging enough to search for the key themes of the recent past in a region of uniformly turbulent yet otherwise diverse countries. The pace of change appears to be accelerating, and with it the rate of surprises. Few in the year 1965 would have predicted that in the year 1970 Chile would be ruled by a Marxist President bent on "legitimate" revolution, Peru would be ruled by a military junta bent on "orderly" revolution,

and Uruguay would be badly disrupted by terrorists bent on violent revolution.

100. Yet if I had to choose, I would for most countries pit the centripetal forces -- including the defensive agility of the elites, the inertia of the peasantry, and the basic apoliticism of the urban poor -- against the centrifugal forces such as the revolutionary insurgents. Especially in the larger, more sophisticated countries, the established elites will probably remain in control in most cases, or at least retain a strong say on the course and limits of change. The policies and postures of the elites may seem more extreme than in the past. Yet I would see as the rule the process of change managed through coalitions and manipulated through coups -- leaving largescale civil wars and thoroughgoing revolutions that drive the elites to the wall as the exceptions. There are already several governments that are reaching for revolutionary changes, and there probably will be more. These are more likely to be led by men from established power groups who will not be free of all restraints from the past -- General Velascos and President Allendes -- rather than by Fidel Castros who will overwhelm the center from the outside and proceed to destroy it.

101. One or another revolutionary insurgent may learn the true lesson of Castro's success, and give as much weight to

political maneuver as to armed combat per se. He may even be, like Castro, a rare and supreme *caudillo*. But he would still need certain advantages to succeed by revolt against the system rather than manipulation from within -- such as indecisiveness among the elites, and especially splits within the military. In any case, in the larger countries, with the more resilient elites, it will probably prove increasingly difficult to outflank and isolate the movable center, which in many cases will itself become more nationalistic, if not also more radical.

102. At least for a while the revolutionary insurgents will probably continue to concentrate on urban terrorism as a tactic. This will generally provide them with a powerful disruptive force, but not necessarily with an effective revolutionary strategy. The force of disruption could produce political polarization, as in Uruguay; a garrison state, as in Brazil; or an incipient civil war, as in Guatemala. But if the government remains reasonably resilient it would still stand a good chance to prevail, if only through promising more for the masses and at the same time tightening the screws against the revolutionaries. The greater danger of the system snapping, as ever, will be in the smaller, less sophisticated countries, where the governments, in a crisis, may rely solely on repression: e.g., the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Guatemala. In Bolivia, the collapse of the military through factionalism and

indecision could also provide a special opportunity to revolutionary groups, if they would be able to avoid the same tendencies.

103. As in the past, important domestic crises will almost always contain some noteworthy foreign aspect. The seemingly increased openness and confusion of politics may attract the ambitious interloper (Cuba again?), while it traps the reluctant one (the United States?). Both the ambitious and the reluctant alike may not be able to place many sure bets on maintaining control, or even strong influence, because of the growing nationalism and likely persistence of political violence as a game that enemies as well as friends can play. Foreign aid to revolutionaries and perhaps to counter-revolutionaries (in Chile, in Cuba?) would not be likely to prove decisive unless the established order is already in danger of collapsing and the outside forces formidable in themselves.

104. The United States will probably continue to be the "most significant other" for all or nearly all the Latin American countries, even though its influence and levels of interest and concern are likely to continue to decline. In most South American cases, the US government will probably be prepared to suffer in relative silence rather sharp reverses in interest, especially if a well-entrenched government is directing the anti-US moves. While it cannot avoid becoming involved in crises of political violence at least indirectly

and on a minor scale, there is little chance of a massive and direct US intervention *against* governments in South America. Governmental moves to establish Soviet military bases, however, would be likely to increase the pressures for US intervention. Concern for the Caribbean will probably continue at a higher level than for South America, and thus provide a lower threshold for intervention generally. Indeed, the US reduction of presence in more distant regions of the world could increase the desire to retain control in the region closest to home. US intervention *for* governments -- i.e., against revolutionary insurgencies -- will probably continue, but at a more selective level. Washington will not be without concern for avoiding a Latin American "Vietnam".

105. Cuba is unlikely to remain the second most significant *other* to the same extent as in the 1960s. Brazil, Chile, and Peru, if successful in coping with national problems, would be likely to become the models for the forces for change in neighboring countries. In addition, there would be some chance of direct intervention by Brazil and Argentina in an Uruguayan crisis and by Argentina and Peru in a Chilean crisis.

106. It almost certainly will require a confrontation between two world powers to transform a national crisis into a world crisis.

The United States, willing or not, could provide one side. But would there be another? If logic is any guide, we can expect the Soviet Union to continue on a cautious and pragmatic course in Latin America. It has more promising areas for expansion of influence elsewhere, and in any case would seek to avoid a crisis in the Western Hemisphere unless the United States seemed unusually weak or uninterested. It could back or drift into a crisis, based perhaps on misestimation of US intentions, but only in areas where there would already be a sizeable Soviet stake. That would seem limited to Cuba now, and perhaps Chile later in the decade.

107. Towards the end of the seventies, other world powers might conceivably have a large enough stake in Latin America to somehow become involved in a crisis. Japan comes first to mind, because of its expanding economic interests; China perhaps second, as a source of assistance to revolutionary insurgencies. In general, though, the great powers may conclude that the costs of influence in Latin America are too high, and the risks of reversals too great. There may even be a tendency to permit Latin America, South America particularly, to stew for a decade in its own juices to see what emerges. Thus, while there certainly will be crises and headlines, there is little chance of a Second Vietnam, or a Second missile crisis, or a Third world war.